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RENNARD STRICKLAND:
On behalf of the American Indian law students at the University
of Tulsa I want to welcome you to this meeting. I think all of us hold a
belief that law can be, when properly used, an important weapon in the
battle for the rights of Indian people. On that premise we have gath-
ered here this afternoon.
I have brought along an item from our special collections which
we just recently acquired, a 1787 ordinance of the State of Georgia. All
of us who have worked in the field for a long time have heard about
laws like this, but this is the first time I have actually seen a printed
copy of this law. It is entitled An Act for Suppression of the Indian
1
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Being Enacted by the Representatives of the Free Men of the State of
Georgia in General Assembly. "Met and by the authority of the same
that from and immediately after the passing of this act the Creek Indi-
ans shall be considered as without the protection of this state and it
shall be lawful for the government and the people of the same to put to
death or capture the said Indians wheresoever they may be found
within the limit of the state." I read this simply to suggest the magni-
tude of the dangers that are present in the abuse of law.
This afternoon we are focusing on an area of the law which I think
everyone who works in the field of Indian law believes is a crucial one
at this particular juncture in American Indian law and history. We
have some of the most distinguished figures in the field on our panel
and some equally distinguished members in our audience. One of the
things we hope for this afternoon is a discussion of questions concern-
ing where we are, where we should go and what we ought to be doing
at this time in the field.
Our first and principal speaker is Mr. Robert Pelcyger from the
Native American Rights Fund, a knowledgeable attorney who is uni-
versally regarded for his support of Indian rights and for his under-
standing of Indian water law.
MR. PELCYGER:
Thank you, Rennard, for your kind introduction and thank you
for inviting me here to talk with you today. I am very happy to be here,
among other reasons, because I think we are at a particularly critical
juncture in the field of Indian water rights. We stand at an important
crossroads. This is the theme I would like to address today. In keeping
with the spirit of being here at the University of Tulsa, I am going to
try to view things from a historical perspective.
We practicing attorneys wait on and endlessly analyze, it seems,
every word, every sentence, every footnote in relevant Supreme Court
decisions to get clues or cues about which way the law and the Court
are heading. The problem is that we are getting very conflicting sig-
nals. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed any substantive
aspects of Indian water rights since its 1963 decision in Arizona v. Cali-
fornia.' An important aspect of that decision is that, apart from deal-
ing with Indian water rights, the Supreme Court for the first time,
applied concepts and principles that had been developed in prior In-
1. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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dian cases to other federal reservations, such as federal wildlife areas
and forests. The Court held that these enclaves were also entitled to
reserved fights under similar doctrinal principles that had previously
been applied to Indian water rights.
This development, although seemingly innocuous from the stand-
point of Indian water rights at the time, contributes significantly to
some of the present problems that we practitioners in the field of Indian
water rights are now facing. Because the Supreme Court has not, since
1963, directly addressed any substantive aspects of Indian water fights,
we must look elsewhere to determine the thinking of the current Court.
In 1976, the Supreme Court rendered an important decision in the case
of Cappaert v. United States.2 It was a unamimous decision, a resound-
ing victory for federally reserved rights. It was not an Indian case. It
involved water rights for the pupfish, an endangered species in the
Devil's Hole National Monument. The Supreme Court held that when
Devil's Hole was set aside, sufficient water to maintain the pupfish was
implicitly reserved.
Cappaert was the first case to apply the concept. of federally re-
served water rights to goundwater. The Court seemed to go out of its
way to strengthen the Federally Reserved Rights Doctrine. For exam-
ple, the Court stated that when federal reserved water rights are in-
volved there is no balancing test. Rather, the question is how much
water is required to fulfill the federal purpose and that comes first re-
gardless of whatever economic or other impact competing water users
might suffer. This 1976 decision was rendered by the same nine justices
who have remained on the Court to the present time.
A very different signal emanated from the Court on July 2, 1978.
Two decisions were handed down in water cases that day. Neither one
involved Indian water rights. The two cases were United States v. New
Mexico3 and California v. United States.' The California case dealt
with section 8 of the Federal Reclamation Act of 1902 which provides
that the Secretary of the Interior shall abide by state water law in carry-
ing out reclamation projects. Prior Supreme Court decisions had con-
strued this provision very narrowly to limit the applicability of state
law. California decided to try again. This time, the Supreme Court
reversed its prior decisions and held that the provision did indeed mean
2. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
3. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
4. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
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what it said. The Court went further and stated that section 8 reflected
the federal policy of deferring to state water law. Reference was made
to the Congressional debates on the Reclamation Act of 1902 which
seemed to indicate that deferral to state water laws was not only a mat-
ter of federal policy, but was required by the Constitution itself.
The decision in Calfornia v. United States formed the backdrop
for the opinion issued the same day in United States v. New Mexico.
The federal government claimed water rights for a wide variety of uses.
Minimum stream flows were among the purposes for which national
forests were established. The Supreme Court majority rejected the gov-
ernment's position and held that the only purposes for which water was
reserved for national forests were for management of timber and con-
servation of flows. The opinion began by analyzing the general con-
tours of the Federal Reserved Rights Doctrine. Federally reserved
rights were to be construed as a limited exception to the general policy
deferring to state water law. Therefore, courts should narrowly con-
strue the purposes for which reservations were established to limit the
scope of federally reserved water rights. Indeed, for the first time in the
case law, a distinction was made between the primary purposes of the
reservation and secondary uses for water. The Court held that water
was reserved only for the primary purposes. When the federal govern-
ment wants to use water for secondary uses, it must go to the state and
apply for a water permit and comply with state procedures. This is the
most narrow construction of federally reserved water rights in any
Supreme Court case. It bears repetition that the members of the Court
are the same nine justices who only two years before had emphatically
reaffirmed, expanded, and strengthened the Reserved Rights Doctrine
in the Cappaert case.
Another recent decision which might provide some helpful clues is
the 1979 Indian fishing rights case, Washington v. Fishing VesselAssoci-
ation.5 At issue was how Indians and non-Indians were to divide lim-
ited fishery resources in western Washington. The district court and
the court of appeals held that the Indians were entitled to at least fifty
percent of the harvestable off-reservation catch and the non-Indians
would have the right to the other fifty percent. The government and
tribal attorneys looked to Indian water law to provide some analogy as
to how a limited resource should be allocated between Indians and
non-Indians. In its decision the Supreme Court did refer to these In-
5. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
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dian water rights cases and it held that the Indian rights extended up to
fifty percent of the harvestable catch. For the first time, however, the
Supreme Court injected in the Reserved Rights Doctrine the concept
that Indian rights were limited to what was required for the Indians to
sustain a "moderate living." It remains to be seen whether this stan-
dard will be applied to on-reservation water rights. If it is, it could
mark a substantial retreat from the "practicably irrigable acreage" cri-
terion of Arizona v. California which measured the extent of Indian
water rights according to what is required to develop the Indians' re-
sources rather than by the number of Indians or their needs at any
given time.
The only Indian water rights case to have reached the Supreme
Court in recent years concerned procedural rather than substantive
matters. The question presented was whether the McCarran Amend-
ment, enacted by Congress in 1952, applies to Indian reserved water
rights and permits their adjudication in. state courts. Both the tribes
and the United States have vigorously objected to the adjudication of
Indian water rights in state courts. In other contexts, the Supreme
Court seems to have recognized that state courts are not fair forums for
the adjudication of Indian rights. However, in 1976 the Court held in
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States6 that the
McCarran Amendment does constitute consent for the United States to
be sued in state court for the adjudication of Indian water rights. The
Supreme Court recently declined to reexamine the basis of that deci-
sion in Jicarila Apache Tribe v. United States.7
All of this does not augur especially well for the future of Indian
reserved water rights. Faced with this backdrop, what can be done and
where do we go? I suggest that we turn to history to the first principles
with the objective of clearly staking out Indian water rights as separate
and distinct from the reserved rights of other federal establishments.
Discussions of Indian water rights generally start with the
landmark case of Winters v. United States,' decided by the Supreme
Court in 1908. The roots of the doctrine, I suggest, go back much fur-
ther. The Winters decision must be viewed, not as a departure from a
general policy of deferring to state law in water matters, but as resting
on firmly established principles of Indian law. The place to begin is
6. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
7. 601 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979).
8. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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Chief Justice Marshall's seminal opinion in Worcester v. Georgia ,9 and
its progeny, holding that state law does not apply to Indians within
reservations or to Indian property.
In United States v. Kagama,1° the Supreme Court in 1886 stated
that the people of the states were the Indians' deadliest enemies. In this
historical context, it would be inconceivable, for the purposes of Indian
reservations and the fulfillment of federal Indian policy, to depend on
the various state water laws and the discretionary acts of state officials.
Within the confines of Indian reservations, federal law was to apply, to
the exclusion of state law, unless and until Congress specifically legis-
lated to the contrary. This is apparent not only from Worcester and the
Supreme Court later decisions, but also from the federal Constitution,
which carves out a special place for Indians. This is also apparent from
the Indian disclaimer provisions in most of the constitutions, enabling
acts, and organic acts of the Western states, in which, as a condition for
their admission to the union, the states agreed that Indian lands would
be subject to the absolute jurisdiction of the federal government.
Therefore, the first principle upon which the Indian Reserved
Water Rights Doctrine is predicated is that state law simply does not
and could not apply, regardless of the federal government's policy in
other areas. There has never been any manifestation of a Congres-
sional intent to defer to state water laws with regard to Indian lands.
The only remaining question, then, is what should be the content of the
federal law defining Indian water rights.
To answer this question, I turn to another pre- Winters precedent,
United States v. Winans,1 which like Washington v. Fishing Vessel As-
sociation, involved off-reservation Indian fishing rights. In Winans, the
Indians had reserved off-reservation fishing rights when they accepted
much smaller reservations for their permanent homes. The Indians
were denied access to their off-reservation fishing sites by private land-
owners abutting the stream. The Supreme Court held that part of the
Indians' reserved fishing right included an easement to cross private
lands to obtain access to off-reservation sites. Without the easement,
the Indians could not exercise their fishing rights. So, prior to Winters,
the Supreme Court held that the Indians retained the rights that are
necessary to carry out the purpose and the effect of the treaty.
9. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
10. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
11. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
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There is another relevant aspect of the Winans decision. The non-
Indians, Mr. Winans and others, maintained a very efficient fishing
wheel by virtue of a license issued by the state which interfered with the
Indians' fish taking operations. The Supreme Court held that the state
license could not infringe upon the rights of the Indians reserved by the
treaty.
Prior to the Winters decision, then, two crucial principles emerged.
First, state law does not apply to Indians, or to Indian lands. Second,
under federal law, the Indians retained, and the United States con-
firmed and reserved, the property rights that are necessary to give effect
to the purpose of the federal treaties or federal Indian policies. When
these two principles are applied to the water rights area, the results are
very interesting.
Water rights in the western states are governed primarily by the
Doctrine of Prior Appropriation. Under this doctine, first in time is
first in right. The first parties who put water to beneficial use are re-
warded by obtaining priority to the water in time of shortage. This
concept of prior appropriation is fundamentally inconsistent with the
purpose for the establishment of Indian reservations.
The inconsistency is exemplified in the Winters case. Not surpris-
ingly, the non-Indians living adjacent to the reservation along the same
water course beat the Indians to the punch and put the water to use
first. Under the law of prior appropriation there would not have been
any water left for the Indians. The federal government's purpose in
establishing the reservation, to provide a permanent home for the Indi-
ans and to transform them into agriculturalists, could not have been
fulfilled under the law of prior appropriation. The Indians could not
have been expected to compete successfully against the white man
under the white man's rules. Since state law cannot apply to reserva-
tion Indians and their property, the only real question in the Winters
case involved the definition and the content of the federal law. Consis-
tent with the Winans decision, the Supreme Court held that sufficient
water was reserved by the Indians and the federal government to give
effect to the treaty and to the federal policy.
Seen in this way, Winters was not a radical departure from the
historical policy of congressional deference to state water laws. Rather,
Winters was grounded in, fully consistent with, and, was indeed dic-
tated by fundamental principles of Indian law. Indian property is not
governed by state law and federal law will imply whatever property
1980]
7
et al.: American Indian Water Law Symposium
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1979
TULSA LAW JO URNAL
rights are necessary to give effect to federal treaties and the purposes
for which Indian reservations were established. From this perspective,
the aberration is not the Indian Reserved Water Rights Doctrine, but
the extention of that Indian Doctrine to other federal reservations as
held in Arizona v. Caifornia in 1963. In any event, regardless of what
is or is not aberrational, Indian reserved water rights and federal re-
served water rights are not the same. They are not governed by the
same rules because Indians occupy a unique position with regard to
their historic immunity from state law and with regard to their implied
rights under federal law that are necessary to the fulfillment of federal
Indians policies.
The Winters case held, of course, that Indians or the federal gov-
ernment (and I do not propose to get involved today in that debate as
to who did the reserving), reserved the waters that are necessary to ful-
fill the purposes of the reservation. But there is more to it, I suggest,
than that. In Winters, the non-Indians argued that the lands they occu-
pied were previously Indian reservation lands but that they were ceded
by the Indians to the United States. That cession, their argument con-
tinued, was obtained by the federal government as part of its policy to
settle the West. At the time of the cession, it was contemplated that the
ceded lands would be open up to homesteading by non-Indians. To be
homesteaded, the lands had to be cultivated. So Mr. Winters and his
codefendants argued that water was every bit as essential to fulfill the
federal homesteading policy as it was to implement federal Indian pol-
icy.
The Supreme Court recognized this "conflict of implications" be-
tween the Indians' retention of the water that was necessary to their
reservation and the federal government's acquisition of the water to
enable the non-Indians to settle upon and cultivate the ceded lands.
The Supreme Court resolved this conffict of implications in favor of the
Indian, notwithstanding the acknowledged conflict between these two
federal purposes concerning the legitimate expectations of both the In-
dians and the non-Indians. This is a very important aspect of the Win-
ters decision because in so much of present day Indian water rights
litigation the principal dispute is between the Indian reservations and
federal reclamation projects. The issue in these cases is whether the
federal government intended to extinguish whatever Indian rights were
necessary to carry out the reclamation project. The Winters case, as I
see it, is a complete answer to that contention.
[Vol. 15:699
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The other aspect of the Winters case that I find fascinating is that
its rationale cannot be limited to an abstract reservation of a water
right. Surely the federal government did not intend to create a water
right on a piece of paper that could be looked to and held up and read
"see here we have the first right on the stream." It is a right to use
water to cultivate the soil, to gain sustenance from the land. It is a
vital, essential element in the policy of transforming Indians from
hunters and food gatherers to a pastoral people. So the water right is
itself only a small part of the Winters case which proclaims that the
federal government has undertaken to provide whatever assistance is
necessary to make the reservations bloom. A paper water right would
not suffice to achieve that objective.
No one has yet devised a legal mechanism to make the federal
government deliver on all of its promises, but that does not mean that
we should stop trying. The Winters principles are there to lead and
guide us and to serve as a reminder to the dominant society of the
enormous gap between what was intended and what has resulted.
PROFESSOR STRICKLAND:
Our next speaker is Reid Chambers, who has been involved in
almost all phases of the lawyering profession. He has been a law pro-
fessor; he has been a government lawyer as Associate Solicitor for In-
dian Affairs; now he is what they sometimes like to describe as a real
lawyer. He is practicing in Washington, D.C. and representing a great
number of Indian tribes in the process.
MR. CHAMBERS:
Rennard, thank you and thank you all for inviting me here today.
Bob Pelcyger spoke about an exceedingly important topic: the differ-
ence between state law and federal law concerning water rights. Per-
haps I should begin with a brief description of these differences. Let us
take any stream west of the hundredth meridian, a line roughly from
Bismarck, North Dakota to Amarillo, Texas, which is generally
thought of as the beginning of the West. Those of you who are from
the West know that many things are called rivers in the western part of
the country which really are just dry beds most of the year. When they
are filled with water, who has the right to take it?
Virtually all of the western states, except those on the Pacific coast
where there is more water (Oregon and California being the two excep-
1980]
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tions), have adopted the Prior Appropriation Doctine. Under that doc-
trine, the first in time is first in right. Suppose that the first person who
comes on the stream (let's call him A) takes some water out of that
stream and uses it beginning in 1900. A gets the first right on the
stream. Suppose he appropriates 100 "acre feet" of water, enough
water to cover one hundred acres with one foot. His "priority date," a
concept I will explain in a moment, is 1900. Then B comes along in
1905 and appropriates 100 acre feet. He gets a water right under the
prior appropriation doctrine to 100 acre feet with a 1905 priority date.
What happens if there is only 100 acre feet in the stream in a dry year?
A gets it all because A has the first or prior right. He can cut B off
entirely, and it simply does not matter whether B has invested hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars in a cattle industry or in digging irrigation
ditches and lining them. The law is that as long as A continuousy uses
his 100 acre feet, he may continue to cut off B. Of course, Cand D and
E and everyone down the line are also cut off. But A's use must be
continuous, for unlike other property rights, appropriative water rights
can be lost by abandonment.
Now, what happens if we put an Indian reservation downstream?
Suppose the Indian reservation was established by a statute in 1888.
This is essentially the Winters case. What happens if the Indian reser-
vation, or the United States as trustee for the Indian reservation, sues A
and B and Winters and all other non-Indians who have begun appro-
priating on the stream? The Winters case holds that enough water was
reserved for beneficial purposes on the reservation when this reserva-
tion was established in 1888, and that in shortage it can cut off the
defendants even though they have been appropriating water since 1900.
It does not matter that the Indians have never appropriated water, or
that A and B actually used water first. The early Indian "priority
date"--1888--gives them the first right.
The Winters Doctrine may be viewed as a set of exceptions to state
law. Recall that ifA failed to use his 100 acre feet for a period of years,
under state law he would lose his right and B would become first on the
stream. So, all non-Indian appropriators must continually use the
water to have a state law right. An unused right is abandoned under
state law under the theory that water is so scarce that a person should
not retain a right he doesn't use. The Indians, however, need never
have used the water under the Winters Doctrine to have a Winters
right. In 1980, this Indian reservation can decide to develop an irriga-
[Vol. 15:699
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tion project if the Indians have a beneficial use. If the use is within the
"purposes of the reservation" a concededly vague concept, the Indians
can cut off A and B and every use on down the line.
State law principles of the Prior Appropriation Doctrine are in
many important respects, supplanted by federal law. Put differently,
federal law exempts Indian water rights from the many limitations that
state law imposes on non-Indian water users. Water is not required to
be put to immediate use, a right is not lost by non-use, and actual use is
not the measure and extent of Indian water rights. In these respects,
federal law protects Indian water rights from interference by state law
doctrines.
Before discussing the purposes of this federal law doctrine, I will
briefly discuss some of the cases where it has been applied. Bob men-
tioned the Pyramid Lake'2 case, which involved an Indian reservation.
The land area of the reservation was shaped like a doughnut around
the lake and the lake area was the terminus of the Truckee River that
flowed into it. In about 1902, the federal government built a dam up-
stream and started taking most of the water out of the Truckee River to
grow alfalfa for a federal reclamation project. Of course, gradually, the
lake shrunk. The fish in the lake that were the major source of support
for the tribe have died because the lake is getting too salty and they
cannot get upstream to spawn. The Government belatedly sued the
people diverting the water (even though the federal reclamation project
was built with federal funds) and asserted the water right for the Pyra-
mid Lake Tribe.
When I worked with the Government and we filed this suit, we left
the marshall with thirteen thousand subpoenas to serve from his two-
man office because he had to sue everybody along the stream to adjudi-
cate these rights. Each of them is an indispensable party in such a
property case. The issues are extremely controversial because A com-
plains that he has spent half a million dollars and that his family has
been here for two generations, using this water since 1900 or 1910.
This gives some insight into the single most extraordinary feature
about the Winters case, the fact that it has been cited so infrequently. It
has been the subject of very few subsequent cases. When I was a new
law professor at UCLA teaching Indian law, I reluctantly decided that
I had better read all of the cases that had cited the Winters case for a
lecture on water rights. I was appalled to even think of it because I
12. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973.)
1980]
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thought a landmark case of 1908 would require three or four days in
the library to shepardize. I put it off as long as I could. Finally I went
to the Shephard's Citator, pulled it down, and looked up Winters. To
my astonishment, I found ten or twelve cases that had cited Winters.
That was in 1970 or 1971. In the sixty-three years since the Winters
case, only ten or twelve cases have applied its principles. There are
many reasons for that. One reason is that you do have to sue such a
large number of people to adjudicate the right, like in Pyramid Lake.
When you do, they all get lawyers and the state sometimes gets in-
volved. These cases may go on for ten, twenty, or even thirty years.
Another reason is the extraordinary political sensitivity of these cases.
I think it is fair to say that the United States Government has not usu-
ally had the courage to bring suits that can cut off all of the rights of
these people. The defendants in such cases are the people who have
been able to get the federal dollars to build projects to take the water
instead of having water used on Indian reservations. The non-Indians
believe that they are making the highest and best use of the water in the
strictly economic sense. The senators and congressmen who got the
authorizations for these non-Indian projects would, of course, protest
suits such as these. So, over the years, essentially for all of these rea-
sons, there has been no enforcement of the Winters Doctrine right.
Those times have ended. The exciting thing about Indian law in
our generation-in the legal careers of the people in this room-is that
when our children shephardize the Winters case, they are going to find
many more than ten or twelve cases citing it. The government has be-
come more vigorous, in recent years, in enforcing this right. Also, the
states and their non-Indian water users have become more concerned
about water rights. In the last couple of weeks, a suit was filed in South
Dakota by the State against all of the tribes of the Sioux Nation to
adjudicate all of the water rights in that State west of the Missouri
River. In Montana, suits have been filed by the United States to adju-
dicate all of the water rights of all of the Indian tribes in Montana.
Those suits were dismissed in favor of subsequent state court proceed-
ings so that we are now in the Ninth Circuit arguing that they should
not have been dismissed. In the state of Washington, three law suits
adjudicating water rights are pending. Law suits have been fied to
challenge the water rights of most of the Arizona tribes. There is, of
course, the Pyramid Lake suit in Nevada concerning the right of the
Pyramid Lake Tribe, which is one of the two largest tribes in Nevada.
[Vol. 15:699
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There are suits concerning the San Juan River in New Mexico. Several
suits concerning the water rights of the Indian Pueblos on the Rio
Grande are pending, as is a major suit concerning the Wind River Res-
ervation and the Big Horn River in Wyoming.
Certainly, as our legal careers progress, some of the comers of the
Winters doctrine will be sanded down. We can only speculate on its
future. The major modem suit, Arizona v. California, was brought to
adjudicate water rights in the Colorado River below Lee's Ferry, which
is essentially on the Arizona-Utah line. Seven and a half million acre
feet is the average annual flow of the Colorado River. Indians were
awarded one million of those acre feet, approximately fifteen percent of
the acre feet of the Colorado River. Because the decree was reopened,
the Indians may end up with as much as twenty percent of the flow of
the lower Colorado River. Now, that is a doctrine that one would not
expect to see before one went to law school.
What is the future of all this? The hard question is whether we can
expect the dominant society, the two hundred million Anglos, not the
million Indians, to continue to accept a doctrine like this? In an era
where it is to be actively litigated? To be sure, it has not often been
enforced, but the cases that have considered the issue have supported
the Indians. The existence of the doctrine illustrates the creative ten-
sion between the practical bent of our society and its idealistic nature,
the ambivalence our society feels in its economic aspiration to devote
resources to their highest and best use, and its guilt about the way Indi-
ans have been treated in the past. To predict the future of the doctrine,
more thought and more careful historical research should be done to
determine why the doctrine was established. I think that the Winters
Court intended to support a certain cultural pluralism. I think that the
cases of that time, too, reflect the kind of a notion that John Marshall
had about the federal protection of Indians from state sovereignty.
This protection may have been seen as a necessary component of re-
tained cultural diversity. Coercive state jurisdiction would interfere
with and probably destroy that cultural diversity.
While cultural diversity is something we prize, I suspect that there
is a less attractive side to the matter. The 1908 Court was the "progres-
sive generation" in America. The progressive era was not as tolerant in
race relations, at least in the sense of racial tolerance today. Perhaps
Winters and Winans,3 seemingly pro-Indian cases of that time, come
13. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
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out of the same mold as Plessy v. Ferguson.14 The dominant society, in
the years before World War I, essentially encouraged racial separatism.
If, then, racial separatism was to be maintained on Indian reservations,
it was perhaps necessary to confer enough resources to keep that society
separate. The Court may, at least in a vague way, have hoped that
Indians would not then come out and mingle much with the white soci-
ety. Now, of course, the Warren Court in 1963 that applied the Winters
Doctrine to Arizona v. California was of the opposite mentality. This
Court was motivated by sympathy for the economic underdevelopment
of the Indian reservations and probably not by a desire to foster or
preserve a separate cultural identity for Indians. The language of the
decision reflects this. The Court emphasized that "it can be said with-
out overstatement that when the Indians were put on these reservations
they were not considered to be located m the most desirable area of the
Nation. 5 It also stated, quoting the construing Winters, that Indian
reservation "lands were arid and, without irrigation, were practically
valueless" and when reservations were created waters were reserved
"without which their lands would have been useless."' 6 Because of the
scarcity of water in the western states, and the dependence of Indian
economic development upon water, the Court perceived enforcement
of federal Indian water rights as essential to economic well-being for
the reservations. The decision was in keeping with broader social and
political themes of the 1960's-an emphasis on economic development
of minority peoples (both here and abroad), a policy of greater eco-
nomic equality, somewhat consonant with the overriding commitment
of the Warren Court to greater racial equality. That policy, of course,
is dramatically different from the racial and cultural separatism of the
Court that decided Winters.
While the objectives of the Court that decided Arizona v. Califor-
nia differed from the turn-of-the-century Court that decided Winters,
the process emphasizes the health and enduring quality of the Reserved
Rights Doctrine. The doctrine represents the best in our society. To be
sure, the decisions reflect strain and ambivalence. But undergirding the
doctrine is a dominant effort to "keep faith with the Indians." 7 A truly
greedy society would not endeavor to do this at all, and would not have
a reserved rights doctrine. It is to our society's credit that one has de-
14. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
15. 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963).
16. Id. at 600.
17. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
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veloped, and I believe that in our lifetimes we will see it enforced, just
as we have witnessed the enforcement of the equal protection clause in
protection of minority rights.
PROFESSOR STRICKLAND:
Since we are in the process of doing a bit of guessing as to where
we are going, I specifically asked John Vance, former Chairman of the
Indian Claims Commission and current professor of law at the Univer-
sity of Toledo, to look over what is happening today.
JOHN VANCE
I am a law professor. I am new to this field. I share with Reid
Chambers an early childhood and youth in Washington, D.C., but very
early I went to Montana and fell in love with that arrid land and its
people, spending all of my adult life there with the exception of a brief
period in New Guinea and similar places where they have no water
problems. I feel I should say that you have people here who have
proven that lawyers can do the impossible. The stances taken by Reid
Chambers and Kent Frizzell in their exciting work with the federal
government would have been unacceptable before, and now they are
the only acceptable stances. Bob Pelcyger is a walking example of the
fact that the young lawyer should never see any situation as being im-
possible.
When things happen in Montana, they usually happen only once.
One of the things that happened only once was the Custer battle, or the
Custer massacre depending on how you look at it. The Winters case is
a Montana case. I think that one of the important things about the
Winters case is that we lawyers are talking to those country folk out
there who are living with 11, 12, or 13 inches of rainfall a year. They're
living on a desert and believe me they know it. As the grand old Texas
historian Walter Prescott Webb wrote in Harpers a number of years
ago, the western plains nestled up against the Rockies were a desert. It
would be called a desert anywhere but Barry Goldwater and the gover-
nors of Colorado, Montana, Wyoming, and New Mexico got up in
arms and said that he ought to be publicly thrashed. But he was right.
You know that saying about the Powder River up there in Mon-
tana. It is described by those who know it best as being a mile wide, an
inch deep and running uphill. Indeed it does run uphill because at
Rugby, North Dakota, the geographical center of the North American
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continent, the great earth tilts to the north and all of the water runs up
into Canada. Obviously, we should be resentful of this. We should
dam it up, switch it around, and send it back down the Missouri. But
in the interest of taking care of our relations with Candian brothers and
sisters we don't do that. We dam up mostly on Indian reservations.
In the Winters case, as I read it, the Court did not say that the
Indian had roamed the land and that he had the use of all that land.
The reservations are what remained after everything else was taken
away. The Indians had it all. One of the resources Indians first had, of
course, was the water. They used it constantly. It seems to me that the
argument should be made that they have always used it for the purpose
for which it was needed. As a hunting and farming society, they have
always used water. Since we are going to use this ridiculous theory of
prior use, we should recognize that the Indian used it first and he has
continued to use it and he has used all that he needs. Perhaps, this is a
dangerous argument. The better argument is that the Doctrine of Prior
Use ought to be disregarded. It has no more validity in modem society
than many of the other doctrines that have been eliminated.
I don't anticipate this elimination because I come to you today
saying that there isn't any water. The fact that there is no more water is
apparent by what we have done in this country to the ground water.
We really have not even gone into that as far as the law is concerned. I
must tell the story about the Colorado River because when I was on the
Indian Claims Commission, one of the cases that was assigned to me
was the MAohave 8 case.
Along the Colorado River where the Indians finally got a million
acre feet of water, they lived and used the water for fishing and wash-
ing. A dam was built there. It went up high on the river bank because
hydrologists, geologists, and water people said that this was just how
high it should go. It went up even higher. The Indians nearly
drowned, but they survived that one dam. But the dam people decided
to build another. You know how these dam people are: "Let's have
another dam down lower in the river." The Indians were farming
down there when the next dam was built. They opened the dam and it
was head for the high country again! So, there was substantial water
moving back and forth. But the fact of the matter is simply that there is
no water.
I convey to you some wonderful thoughts from our friends the
18. Mohave Tribe v. United States, 23 Ind. C1. Comm. 346 (1970).
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United States Army engineers. The Ogallala aquifer is the ground
water that sits below us here. It sits below Nebraska, Colorado, a little
tip of South Dakota, Kansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Texas.
Texas and California use more of the ground water than any of the
states. They use more ground water than all of the states combined
ought to use. Now the land above the Ogallala aquifer produces
twenty-five percent of the value of export feed grain. It produces al-
most forty percent of all the value of the export shares of wheat and
flour. Forty-three percent of all cotton is produced in this area.
It is absolutely fascinating to see what these engineers plan to do.
This is what they have found. Sincd 1947, the water in the Ogallala
aquifer has dropped 268 feet. In many areas of the country today, the
water is dropping at sixteen feet per year, and in some places eighty feet
per year.
What is happening to the water that is being pumped out? In the
first place, some irrigation water on the crops produces almost three
times as much yield. Water from the vast Ogallala Aquifer is used to
irrigate over 400,000 acres of agricultural land in the panhandle of
Oklahoma alone. This use, in addition to the municipal, domestic, and
industrial needs of the area, is placing great stress on the Ogallala,
Oklahoma's most important source of ground water. There were ap-
proximately 400 ground water wells in the panhandle area in 1960, by
1974 there were 2,067 wells tapping the water of the Ogallala. Over the
past twenty five years declines in the water levels of up to 102 feet have
been recorded. 19
Senator Bob Kerr said he was going to in effect bring the ocean to
Tulsa and he did. The Army engineers plan to take the water away
from other places and bring it to you folks by gigantic viaducts,
aquaducts, and the like. They also intended to take water from the
Fort Peck Reservoir and divert it south into the North Platte River
system in Nebraska to here. This grand plan makes no mention of
drought or its consequences. Also, great coal gasification plants are be-
ing built right out there in the desert! They are requiring such enor-
mous amounts of water that I don't know how we can continue. The
fact of the matter is that every acre foot of water from the Rockies, to
the plains states, to the east of the Rockies, is spoken for today. Any
water taken is being taken from somebody else. I don't need to tell you
19. OKLA. WATER RESOURCES BOARD, PUB. No. 94, OKLA. COMPREHENSIVE WATER PLAN
153 (April 1, 1980).
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who that somebody else may be. The snythetic fuel program is a mon-
ster water user. What has been this great placid, beautiful underwater
lake of pure clean water that we've been using is soon going to be a
boiling caldron.
PROFESSOR STRICKLAND:
We thought it would be appropriate toward the end of the pro-
gram to get a little bit of a perspective on some things that have been
happening in Oklahoma. The most dramatic things in Indian law in
Oklahoma, I believe, are ahead of us. There was a long period when
the law as it related to Oklahoma reflected what the federal govern-
ment had said about Indian law in the state-that there was no longer a
place in the state of Oklahoma where jurisdiction remained with the
Indian tribes; that all of the rights to all of the water in Oklahoma
passed from Indian tribes to the state upon statehood. The last ten or
fifteen years in Oklahoma have been a period in which all of the old
rules of Indian law have passed out of existence. New rules of Indian
law are now coming into existence, and much of what was happening
in other parts of the country with regard to Indian law in the previous
time frame is now beginning to happen in Oklahoma. In Oklahoma
today, a new forward-looking group of Indian tribal leaders are work-
ing with a whole new generation of American Indian lawyers.
We take immense pride at the University of Tulsa in the fact that
over the last 10, 15, or 20 years, the University of Tulsa has been one of
the major centers for the education of Indian people who were becom-
ing lawyers. One of the first graduates of the University of Tulsa under
the American Indian Law Scholarship Program was Ralph Keen, our
next speaker. We also take great pride in the fact that we have a tre-
mendous number of Indian law graduates from 20, 30, and 40 years
ago before it was fashionable for a law school to be educating Indians.
Ralph is not only one of our first graduates under the Indian law schol-
arship. He is also one of our most distinguished graduates of the law
school. Ralph has held top positions in his Cherokee tribe, top posi-
tions in the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and has now become a "real
world" lawyer. One of the interesting phenomena in Indian law in the
last ten or twenty years is the appearance of "real world" Indian law-
yers working in the field of Indian law.
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RALPH KEEN:
I plan to talk just a brief while about the Winters Doctrine and
Indian water law in Oklahoma. A wonderful thing happened for the
Indians back in 1908 in the Winters case. The Court said: "Look, here
are all these people whom the government has been unkind to, put
them on a reservation, lock them up. So we will be nice to them. We
will create this judicial doctrine that they have water rights. We will
put some sugar on it and we will say that the right is prior and para-
mount to any other, that it attached at the time of the creation of that
reservation." That's pretty good isn't it? Except that nothing happened
after that. Not for a long time.
Very little happened between then and Arizona v. Caifornia. But
either way the government could sit back and say it had created this
doctrine, actually a paper right to water. Water is vital in this day and
age. You must have water to live; even more vital than gasoline, be-
lieve it or not. Fifty years later, another court extended that doctrine.
It decided that the Winters Doctrine was so beneficial that our own
government should have the same right for federal reserve properties,
reservations not set aside for Indian people but reservations of land set
aside for federal purposes. In addition, the court went beyond that and
began to define how much water Indians got-all the water necessary
to irrigate their land. Those five tribes of the lower Colorado River are
able to use that water. There are still some open ends to that right. As
Reid Chambers was saying, they hope to acquire more water in the
future for those tribes. It has been beneficial. In the future, it will be
more beneficial.
The government has been good to the Indian people. We have
done much for them. But, in reality, what has really happened is that
while some reservations have been able to benefit, most of them have
not benefited. We have a seventy-year history of the judicial branch of
the federal government being good to Indians. They created this doc-
trine and extended it everywhere. But in Oklahoma it does not exist.
We have a law about this i4 Oklahoma that is only one sentence long.
It states that all water within Oklahoma's borders belong to the State.
There are two flaws in that law. First, it is contrary to international
law. Oklahoma has been the only government in the world to say that
water is capable of ownership. Every other government recognizes that
water can be used, but that it cannot be owned. That is the first prob-
lem with the law. The second problem is that a state cannot legislate
away a superior law. The Winters Doctrine is superior to the laws in
1980]
19
et al.: American Indian Water Law Symposium
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1979
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
the state of Oklahoma. The Winters Doctrine is like the ground
water-it's not there for Oklahoma. In Oklahoma do we have a water
right? The answer is yes. The Winters Doctrine is a right. The federal
government says we have it and we have it. We don't have to ask the
state whether we have a Winters Doctrine. It's there. The federal gov-
ernment says it's there. The Supreme Court has said it's there on a
hundred different occasions. It is there. We have it.
The next question is how much water? Because we are dealing
with quantification, it will take a thousand experts and ten million dol-
lars to answer that question. We Indians do not have either one. We
do not know the limits of the right. But we do have a water right. The
next question is whether we use our water right. But we must answer
that question in the negative. Whose fault is it that we do not use our
water right? The fault is ours and the federal government's because the
federal government has always told us that we do not have a water
right in Oklahoma. Of course, when we ask them for irrigation funds,
they deny those funds. And yet, annually, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
has an irrigation budget of fifty million dollars. Of that budget, twenty-
five or thirty million goes to the Navaho irrigation project. The re-
maining funds to the lower Colorado River tribes, and the tribes in the
western half of the United States with the exception of Oklahoma.
The water in Oklahoma, particularly western Oklahoma is swiftly
dissipating. It is going somewhere, and it is probably being misused.
Western Oklahoma has always been semi-arrid, and it is becoming ar-
rid. More and more, people are trying to live all over the United
States. We have more exotic and expensive uses for water. In
Oklahoma, we Indians don't use the water. I travel around this state
speaking with the tribes and I invariably tell them, "If you have a valid
use for water and that use fits within the Winters Doctrine, do not re-
quest water from anyone! Get out there and use that water! Drill some
wells to get that water!" If there is an Indian tribe having a legitimate
use for water, and a way to scrape together the money to sink a well to
put that water to beneficial use, that tribe can ignore this state. This is a
very exotic doctrine. If our tribes would go out and utilize and develop
what is left of this resource, those tribes will wield more influence and
more power. They will obtain a potential for enriching their own tribal
governments beyond anyone's comprehension.
I do not know whether we will ever make the state of Oklahoma
agree that we have water rights, but it is not necessary to make the state
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agree if we independently develop our water and use it. At some point
in time, the state will be compelled to establish limits if we use too
much water. In the meantime, we should create a Winters Doctrine in
this state. And we should go further than that. We should begin by
using some of this knowledge on Indian reservations.
PROFESSOR STRICKLAND:
I would particularly like to thank the American Indian Law Stu-
dents Association which, with the assistance of the American Bar Asso-
ciation Law Student Division, organized this program, put it together,
and is really responsible for it. If the past ten or fifteen years have been
exciting in Indian law elsewhere, the next fifteen or twenty in
Oklahoma will be unbelievable in terms of the developments which
will occur. I recall two statements. One was from the man responsible
for the creation of the new city of Chicago after the great fire. He told
the people that the bankers who were combining to finance the city's
reconstruction were very stingy with the amount of money that they
would spend and with the goals that they wanted to accomplish. They
were talking about rebuilding various parts of the city and he said,
"Make no small plans, for they have not the power to move men." At
the same time I always think of the statement of Chief Seattle, "it is
hard to hold a great vision." What has been happening in Indian law,
particularly with regard to water rights, is a testament to the fact that
Indian people working through the legal system can help make and
then fulfill great and visionary plans.
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